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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALMA GLENN PRATT,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 14469
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
UINTAH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE

~

This is an action for breach of contract arising out of
Appellant's failure to renew Respondent's contract of employment
with it.

Respondent seeks reinstatement as a teacher with

Appellant and damages for breach of contract including all rights
and benefits which he would have received had he not been improperly
terminated by Appellant.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was tried to a jury on December 10, 1975,
at Vernal, Utah, before the Honorable J* Robert Bullock, Judge.
By stipulation of the parties, the question presented to the jury
was whether or not Respondent resigned his position of employment
with Appellant.

By Special Verdict, the jury found that Respondent

had not resigned his position of employment.

The Court entered

judgment against Appellant on January 28, 1976 awarding Respondent
$18,070.03 in damages and further ordered Appellant to reinstate
Respondent as a teacher together with all rights and benefits he
would have received had he not been terminated contrary to the
terms of his contract of employment with Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the judgment of the District
Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent testified that he was employed at the Whiterocks
School as a school teacher by Appellant for thirteen years from
1959-1973.

(Tt p. 28). At the time of trial, he was 54 years of

age, married and had three children living at home.

(Tr. pp. 26-27).

He had no other occupation since becoming a school teacher.
(Tr. p. 30).
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Respondent testified that he had planned to teach another ten
years.

(Tr. p. 30).
During March, 1973, the Superintendent of Appellant

met with Respondent and the other teachers at WhiterocksSchool
in the Uintah District where the Respondent taught school.
(Tr. pp. 27, 28 and 78).

At that meeting, the Respondent and

the other teachers were told that the school would be closed at
the end of the school year and that if any of them desired to
teach elsewhere, they should submit a letter of application for
such other position.

(Tr. pp. 33-34 and 78).

However, Superintendent

Evans admitted on cross-examination that it was the duty of the
school district to hire tenured teachers teaching at the Whiterocks
School in another school in the district. On or about April 1,
1973, Respondent sent a letter to Appellant requesting a teaching
position at the Todd Elementary School in the Uintah District.
(Tr. p. 32, Ex. 1 ) .
Appellant states that certain events followed
Respondent's letter requesting another teaching position with the
District.

Essentially, Mr. Ashel Evans, Superintendent of Appellant,

maintains that Respondent resigned his position of employment at
a meeting at which only the two of them were present.

(See

Appellant's Brief pp. 3-4). Respondent testified he did not
resign.

(Tr. pp. 35-37).

Respondent further testified that
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Superintendent Evans had advised him that since the District

was

closing the WhiterocksSchool, Respondent would have to apply for
a job.

Respondent replied that his position of employment was

with the District and not just the school.

Respondent then testified

that Mr. Evans advised him: 'Veil, you have tenure at the school
but not in the District."

(Tr. p. 34).

Superintendent Evans

testified on direct examination that in late April or early May,
1973, Respondent advised him that he was resigning.

Respondent

denied that he ever resigned and the jury believed Respondent.
Accordingly, this Court should accept the fact that Respondent did
not resign his position of employment.

Toomers Estate v. Union

Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163 (1951); Lym v.
Thompson,112 Utah 24, 184 P.2d 667 (1947).

Nevertheless,

"Appellant proceeded to fill the vacancy left by Respondent's
resignation."

(Tr. p. 81).

On June 27, 1973, a letter was sent to Appellant by the
Uintah Education Association requesting a hearing on behalf of the
Respondent regarding his termination.

On August 14, 1973, a second

request was made for a hearing regarding the termination of Respondent
A hearing was held September 5, 1973.

(R. p. 145).
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Superintendent Evans testified that the purpose
of the hearing was to determine why Respondent had not had his
contract renewed.

(Tr. pp. 85-86).

The minutes of the meeting of

the Board show that when asked when the Board had decided to
terminate Mr. Pratt, "Superintendent Evans stated that the Board
had instructed him to advise all teachers at Whiterock that because
the school was being closed all of their jobs were being terminated."
Part of the language of a valid contract between
Respondent and Appellant provides in relevant part:
Whenever, for any cause, it becomes
necessary to decrease the number of
tenured employees in the school district,
the Board of Education may, at the close
of the school year, release as many of
such employees as may be necessary.
Notice shall be given by the time contracts
are issued. No tenured employee shall be
dismissed under the provisions of this
section while a nontenured emplryee is
retained or employed to render a service
which the tenured employee is certificated
and competent to render. (Emphasis added).
(R. p. 3 ) .
The parties stipulated in the Pre-Trial Order that the
Respondent was a "tenured employee." At trial, counsel for
Appellant agreed that the Appellant did hire untenured teachers
to teach positions Respondent was capable of teaching. (Tr. p. 74).
Superintendent Evans also testified that new teachers were hired
to teach in the District for the 1973-74 school year.
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_c_

(Tr. p. 91).

The sole question submitted to the jury was whether or
not Respondent had resigned his position of employment with Appellant.
The jury found that Respondent had not resigned.

(R. p. 242),

Dan Turner, Clerk-Treasurer.of the Uintah County
School District, testified that he knew the salary and benefits
Respondent would have received during the years for which
Respondent claimed damages and that Respondent's salary and
fringe benefits for 1974 would have been $6,710.71 (Respondent
waived damages for the 1973 portion of the 1973-74 school year).
(Tr. p. 98). Mr. Turner testified that Respondent's salary and
fringe benefits for the 1974-75 school year would have been
$13,373.84 and that those salary and benefit amounts would have
been $6,156.09 from the beginning of the 1975-76 school year
to the date of the trial (December 10, 1975).

-5-
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Mr. Turner testified that Respondent's total salary and job related
benefits would have totaled $26,240.50.

(Tr. p. 98-99).

At no

time did counsel for Appellant object to the foregoing testimony
of Mr. Turner.
Respondent testified that he had sought and taken other
employment from 1973 through 1975.

(Tr. pp. 38-39).

He testified

that his income for 1974 was $3,200.00 as shown by his Federal Tax
Return,

(Tr. p. 38, Ex. 3 ) , and that his 1975 income was $4,970.50

as shown by his check stubs from his current employer.

(Tr. p. 39,

Ex. 4 ) .
On cross-examination, counsel for Appellant asked Respondent
whether or not he had applied for work with the Duchesne School
District.
48).

(Tr. p. 46). Respondent replied that he had.

(Tr. pp. 47-

Counsel for Appellant did not ask Respondent what had come

as a result of his application to the Duchesne School District nor
did counsel pursue whether or not Respondent had made application
for work elsewhere. With respect to Respondent's employment, the
record shows as follows:

-7-
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Q

(BY MR. LYBBERT):

You are presently employed

by Turner Lumber, is that what I understand?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

And how long have you been employed there?

A

Since January of ! 75.
MR. LYBBERT:

I have no further questions

at this time, Your Honor.

(Tr. pp. 49-50).

The only other evidence in the record regarding Appellant's
contention that damages should have been submitted to the jury
appears in the testimony of Mr. Nash at Tr, 109 wherein Mr. Nash
is being asked by Respondent's attorney as to portions of the minutes
of a meeting of the Board of Education of the Uintah County School
District held September 5, 1973. Those minutes state in part:

Mr. Nash asked Mr. Pratt if he was working.
Mr. Pratt replied that he was working at
Turner Building Supply at Roosevelt. Mr.
Nash asked Mr. Pratt if he had applied for
a teaching position in another district.
Mr. Pratt stated that he had applied to the
Duchesne School District. He stated that they
would only allow him six years teaching experience.
He stated that this would require him to take
a loss of income. Mr. Nash stated that the
measure of damage that might be awarded him
could be the difference between what he could
have received with six years experience and
what he could have received at the top of the
salary schedule. (Tr. p. 109, Exhibit 12).
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The Court held

that there was no real issue as to damages

and that damages were a matter of calculation, "there being no
factual dispute it's strictly a matter of law" and that there was
insufficient evidence for the question of mitigation to go to the
jury.

(Tr. p. 130). When asked whether there was any evidence,

the jury could "fasten on" to reduce the amount of damages claimed
by Respondent, counsel for Appellant replied:
and cents figures that they can."

"There aren't dollars

(Tr. p. 133).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
FOR THE REASON THAT:
A.
THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION
PROCEDURES ACT, SECTIONS 53-51-1 ET SEQ.,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (SUPP. 1975) RENDERS
THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT NONAPPLICABLE IN TEACHER
TERMINATION CASES.
B.
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE AMENDED THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT TO PERMIT
ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS WITHOUT COMPLYING
WITH SECTIONS 63-30-12, 63-30-13 AND
63-30-19 OF THAT ACT.
C.
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES
NOT APPLY TO ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST
SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
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A.

THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION.PROCEDURES ACT, SECTIONS

53-51-1 ET SEQ., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (SUPP. 1975) RENDERS THE
PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT NONAPPLICABLE
IN TEACHER TERMINATION CASES.
Appellant argues that Respondent waive his claims under
the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, Sections 53-51-1
et seq., (Supp. 1975) and
of its contention.

cites

a portion of the record in support

One June 10, 1974, Appellant had moved the lower

court to dismiss Plaintiff1s Complaint for the reason, among others,
that

f,

Plaintiff had failed to file Notice of his Claim in accordance

with the provisions of Section 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.!!
On November 19, 1975, the District Court ruled,

!,

The Court is of

the opinion that the Governmental Immunity Act is not applicable
to this case, and upon that basis, Defendant's motion for summary
judgment is denied.M

(R. p. 186).

As is more fully set forth below, the Utah Orderly School
Termination Procedures Act sets forth an administrative procedure
for terminating teachers

which, Respondent submits supersedes the

provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

-10-
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The school district complied with the procedural aspects of
the Act in terminating Respondent when it granted him the hearing he
requested.

Accordingly, when counsel for Appellant asked whether or no1

Respondent was making a claim under the provisions of the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act, counsel for Respondent replied
he was not.
reasons.

(Tr. p. 2 ) . Respondents position is correct for two

First, the question of whether or not the Utah Orderly

School Termination Procedures Act modifies the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act with respect to Respondent's claim
is a matter for the court to decide.
Appellant's position.

The court had decided against

Therefore, the question as to the applicability

of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act was not relevant
to the jury trial.

Second, the Appellant complied with the

procedural requirements of the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act.

Therefore, Respondent submits that his withdrawal

of his claim under the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures
Act was only for the purpose of the trial then scheduled.

To the

extent the Act waived the application of the Governmental Immunity
Act, Respondent submits that his claim under the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act is still relevant.

Even if

Respondent did error in withdrawing his claim, it is a harmless error.
The question of whether or not the Act applied is for the Court to
decide and therefore had no effect on the jury trial.
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It is Respondent's position that the Utah Orderly School
Termination Procedures Act sets forth certain administrative remedies
inconsistent with the notice requirement
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

of Section

63-30-12 of

Section 53-51-4 of the Utah

Orderly School Termination Procedures Act requires in part that the:
• . . board of education of each school
district by contract with its educators
or their associations or by resolution of
the board shall establish procedures for
termination of educators in an orderly
manner without discrimination.
Section 53-51-5, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975), provides
that the orderly school termination procedures adopted by the district:
shall provide:
(1)

a right to a fair hearing.

ickick

(4) at least one month prior to issuing
notice of intent not to renew the contract
of the individual, he shall be informed of
the fact that continued employment is in
question and the reasons therefor and given
an opportunity to correct the defect which
precipitated possible nonrenewal.
(5)

a written statement of causes
(a) pursuant to which the contract of
individuals may not be renewed . . . .

-12-
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Sections 53-51-6 and 53-51-7 of the Utah Code set forth
the procedures pursuant to which the "fair hearing" is to be
conducted and specifically authorizes boards of education to
establish procedures for conducting "fair hearings."
Appellant argues that on or about March 23, 1973,
Superintendent Evans met with Respondent and other teachers at the
Whiterocks School and advised them that the School would be closed
"at the end of the school year and that if any of them desired to
teach elsewhere in the District, they should inform the Appellant
of their intent in writing."

(Tr. p. 78).

Respondent submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act supersedes and renders not applicable those provisions
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which provide for the filing
of a claim before suit may be brought against the school district
for the reason that the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures
Act specifically requires that school districts adopt procedures and
afford teachers employed by them specific procedural rights and
remedies which are different than those contemplated in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

-13-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

For example, the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures
Act gives a teacher certain rights in the nature of job security
and provides "procedural due proces^1for any teacher seeking redress
for violation of the provisions of that Act.

Specifically, the Act

requires that the school district afford teachers a "fair hearing11
(Section 53-51-5(1)) and further provides that school districts shall
provide teachers with "written notice of suspension or final
termination including findings of fact made by the board when such
suspension or termination is for cause" (Section 53-51-5(9)).

The

Act further specifies the procedure pursuant to which the hearing
shall be conducted (Section 53-51-6) and provides that hearing
examiners may be appointed by the school district to conduct hearings
involving the termination of teachers (Section 53-51-7).
It is clear that the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act requires that the school district establish procedures
and a timetable for hearing disputes involving the termination of
teachers.

-14-
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Considerable latitude is allowed school boards in
establishing those procedures.

In the instant case, it is difficult

to determine preciseLy when Respondents "claim" occurred.

Appellant

could argue that Respondents claim occurred on March 23, 1973,
when Superintendent Evans advised the teachers at Whiterocks that
they would have to apply for other employment in the District.
Respondent's claim could have also occurred

in late March or early

May of 1973 (when Superintendent Evans states that Respondent resigned)
or that it occurred when "Appellant proceeded to fill the vacancy
left by Respondents resignation."
Respondent submits that the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act specifically authorizes the school board to establish
procedures for conducting a "fair hearing." Whatever may be the
date on which Respondents "claim" occurred, Appellant set the date
for Respondent's "fair hearing" at a time considerably after the
ninety day period permitted by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
which Appellant urges on this Court.

By its own action, the school

board may defeat the legitimate claim of a tenured school teacher
by delaying an administrative remedy under the Utah Orderly School
Termination Procedures Act beyond the 90 day filing period provided
in the Governmental Immunity Act.
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Furthermore, Section 53-51-7, Utah Code Annotated,
(Supp. 1975) provides in part:
. . . nothing herein shall be construed
to limit the right of either the board
or the educator to appeal to an appropriate
court of law.
Respondent submits that the procedures set forth in the
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act are clearly inconsistent
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and would allow school boards
to defeat the intention of the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act by delaying the nfair hearing11 until long after the
ninety day period afforded in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
had run.
Respondent further submits that the principal purpose
of the requirement that claims be presented or filed within a short
period of time is to provide units of government with full information
as to the rights asserted against it and to enable the local unit of
government to make proper investigation concerning the merit of the
claim and to settle those claims having merit without the expense of
litigation.

17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Section 48.02

at page 60.

-16-
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Statutory . . . provisions requiring
presentation of claims or demands to
municipal corporations or counties
before an action is instituted are in
furtherance of the public policy to
prevent needless litigation and to save
unnecessary expenses and costs by affording
an opportunity amicably to adjust all
claims before suit is brought. The purpose
of provisions requiring notice or statements
of claims as a condition precedent to
instituting a suit for damage against a
municipal corporation is to give municipal
authorities prompt notice of the injury
and the surrounding circumstances in order
that the matter may be investigated while
the matter is fresh, witnesses available,
and before conditions have changed materially,
and that the liability of the municipality
or the extent of liability may be determined.
56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, g 686,
citing cases including Sweet v. Salt Lake City,
43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1169 (1913), 52 ALR 2d 966.
In the instant case, the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act specifically reverses the requirements set forth in
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in that a school district which
terminates

r,

a tenured teacher" must give notice to the teacher of

its intention to terminate him together with the specific reasons
therefor.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that the

injured party state with specificity the basis upon which he asserts
a claim against the governmental entity.
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Respondent submits that procedural provisions of the
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act are inconsistent with
the procedures of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The Utah

Governmental Immunity Act was enacted in 1965 by the Utah Legislature.
The Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act was enacted by
the Utah Legislature in 1973.

The later act affording rights and

requiring procedures different than the earlier act necessarily
prevails over the earlier act. West Beverage Co. of Provo v.
Hansen, 98 Utah 332, 96 P.2d 1105 (1940).
Where two legislative acts are repugnant to, or in
conflict with each other, the last one passed, being the latest
expression of the legislative will, will, although it contains
no repealing provisions, govern, control or prevail so as to
supersede and repeal the earlier act to the extent of the repugnancy.
Bullenv. Anderson, 81 Utah 151, 17 P.2d 213 (1932); 82 CJS, Statutes,
Section 294, p. 489.

If the enforcement of an earlier statute

would thwart the purposes of a later one, the courts will resort
to the doctrine of repeal by implication.

State ex rel. Medford and

Pear Co. v. Fowler, 207 Ore. 182, 295 P.2d 167 (1955).

-18-
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B.

THE UTAH LEGISLATURE AMENDED THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

TO PERMIT ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL
UNITS WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 63-30-12, 63-30-13 AND
63-30-19 OF THAT ACT.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act at Section 63-30-5,
Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived as to any contractual
obligation and actions arising out of
contractual rights or obligations shall
not be subject to the requirements of
sections 63-30-12, 63-30-13 or 63-30-19
of this act. (1975 Amendment underlined).
The 1975 Session of the Utah Legislature specifically
permitted actions against governmental entities arising out of
contractual rights or obligations to be brought without the filing
of a notice of claim.
Respondent submits that the action of the 1975 Legislature
is relevant to his case even though his claim occurred some time
during 1973.

The amendment to the Utah Governmental Immunity

Act was a remedial statute relating only to the procedure by
which Respondent could secure his rights under the Utah Orderly
School Termination Procedures Act.

As such, the amendment may

properly be construed to operate retrospectively and applies
to this action.
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. . . remedial or procedural statutes
which do not create, enlarge, diminish,
or destroy contractual or vested rights
but relate only to remedies or modes of
procedure are not within the general
rule against retrospective operation but
are generally held to operate retrospectively. Such statutes will not be
given retrospective operation if to do
so would impair contractual obligation
or severe vested rights, unless the
language of the statute indicates that
such is the legislative intent.
While it has been held that a remedial
statute will not be given retrospective
or retroactive operation unless the
legislative intent appears on the face
of the statute, expressly, by plain and
positive language, or by necessary
implication, the rule that, unless the
language of the statute so requires, the
statute shoudd not be given retrospective
or retroactive operation has been held
not to apply to purely remedial laws,
unless an intent to the contrary is shown;
and a remedial statute is to be construed
to give affect to the purpose for which it
was enacted, and, the reason of the statute
extends to the past transactions as well as
those in the future, it will be so applied,
although it does not, in terms, so direct,
unless to do so would impair some vested
right or violate some constitutional guarantee.
82 CJS Statutes, § 614;(see also 82 CJS Statutes,
§ 421.
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It is the general rule that provisions added by
amendment affecting substantive rights are intended to operate
prospectively only and that provisions added by amendment affecting
substantive rights will not operate retrospectively unless the
legislature has expressly stated its intent or such intent is
fairly implied by the language of the amendment or by the
circumstances surrounding its enactment that the amendment operate
retrospectively.

McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board,

111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725 (1947);

Oakland Construction Co. v.

Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (1974); Sands, Sutherland
Statutory Construction, p. 200, Section 22.36 (4th Ed.).
However, in the absence of a savings clause, or statute
or some other clear indication that the legislative intent is to
the contrary, provisions added by amendment which affect procedural
rights or legal remedies are construed to apply to all cases pending
at the time of its enactment and all those commenced subsequent
thereto, whether the substantive rights sought to be enforced
thereby accrued prior or subsequent to the amendment unless a vested
right would be thereby impaired.

Sands, Sutherland Statutory

Construction, p. 200, Section 22.36 (4th Ed.).
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The construction of remedial statutes requires great
liberality and whenever meaning is doubtful, it should be construed
to extend the remedy.

Contractual Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction

Co., 46 C.2d 423, 296 P.2d 108, 51 ALR2d 914 (1956).
In Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wash.2d 652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960),
the court held that a remedial statute has retroactive application
when it relates to practice, procedure or remedies and does not
affect a substantive or vested right.

Accord, Beneficial Management

Corp. of America, 85 Wash.2d 637, 583 P.2d 510 (1957).
Respondent submits that the filing of a notice required
in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is merely jurisdictional
barring the court from considering actions against the State and
its political subdivisions.

As the notice requirement no longer

applies to actions arising out of contract, the bar to the
jurisdiction of the court has been waived by the Legislature.
Notwithstanding the fact that the cause of action arose before
the subject amendment to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the
lower court had jurisdiction to hear this action even though

-22-
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Respondent did not file the notice, because the action arose out of
a breach of contract.
Although there is authority to the contrary,
Respondent submits:
• . . where clearly intended, or in the
absence of an intent to the contrary,
a statute conferring jurisdiction may
operate to give jurisdiction over causes
of action arising before the passage of
the act. 82 CJS, Statutes, Section 423«
C.

THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO ACTIONS

BROUGHT AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
This cause of action against the
Appellant is not governed by the language of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.

Section 63-30-2(5) defines "claim" as:
. . • any claim brought against a
governmental entity or its employees
as permitted by this Act. (Emphasis added) •

Section 53-4-8, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), found in
the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, provides in relevant part:
Said boards (of education) . . . may
sue and be sued . . . .

-23-
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It is clear from the language of Section 53-4-8 that,
if Respondent ever had governmental immunity, such immunity was
waived in 1898 and not in 1965 when the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act became effective.
Section 53-4-8 specifically authorized suits against
Appellant.

Accordingly, Respondent's action for breach of contract

against the Appellant is not governed by the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
For any of the foregoing reasons, Respondent need not
comply with the notice requirement of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED
APPELLANT TO PAY DAMAGES AND TO
REINSTATE RESPONDENT IN ITS EMPLOYMENT.
In this cause of action, Respondent sought both damages
and reinstatement.

Appellant does not question the authority of the

court to award damages (if the action is properly before the court),
but does question the propriety of the court ordering Respondent
reinstated. An affirmative injunction ordering a party to perform
under the provisions of a contract will be treated as an order of
specific performance.

Specific performance of a contract will be

given as a substitute for the remedy of damages where the legal
remedy is inadequate or impractical.

Specific performance will be

ordered to prevent the travesty of justice involved in permitting
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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parties to refuse the performance of their contracts at their
pleasure while electing to pay adequate damages for the breach.
71 AmJur 2d, Specific Performance, Section 1.
In order to grant

a prayer for specific performance of

a contract, the remedy afforded at law must be as plain, adequate,
competent and efficient as the remedy of specific performance and
not insufficient or doubtful.

Halloran-Judge Trust Co. v. Heath,

70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342 (1927), 64 ALR 368.
Appellant argues that Respondent had an adequate remedy
at law for the prospective breach of his employment contract with
Appellant and that Appellant is therefore precluded from injunctive
relief.

Respondent submits that he had no adequate remedy for

prospective breach for the reason that his claim to such damages
would have been speculative and uncertain.
Security Corp., 82 Utah2d

316, 24 P.2d

B.T. Moran v. First

384 (1933).

Counsel for Appellant admitted that there were no dollar
and cent figures in this case.

(Tr. p. 133). Furthermore, Appellant's

reliance on the Ha11oran case, supra, is not well founded.

In

Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P. 2d 930 (1938),

-25-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reh. den. 96 Utah 104, 85 P.2d (1938), Genola sought an order of the
court compelling Santaquin to provide it with water pursuant to the
terms of a written agreement.

One of the terms of the written

agreement conditioned Santaquin1s performance upon receiving federal
funds to assist in the construction of the project.

Santaquin argued

that the contract was not enforceable for want of mutuality for the
reason that it, at its sole discretion, could have defeated the
contract by not applying for federal funds.

The court held at

96 Utah 96-97:
Such is the case with many contracts whose
binding effect depends on a condition
precedent, the carrying out of which
condition precedent lies within the power
of only one of the parties to the contract.
Th rule regarding mutuality of obligation
as making the contract amenable to specific
performance is more honored by
than by obedience to the rule. The doctrine
of mutuality has gone through the course
of most legal developments. Great legal
minds have fashioned the law from the staff
of life by applying a solution which fits
the justice of the actual case. • . .
The old doctrine of mutuality of remedy is
a concrete example of a rule which has been
so eroded by necessary exceptions as to leave
it more of a vestige than a substantiality.
/> s\ /\ /\

Specific performance is granted by equity
when it is plain that the party
should
and can perform and refuses to do so, an
injustice not remedial by a monetary judgment
would otherwise result. The doctrine that
at the time of making the contract there must
be mutual fixed obligations is not tenable.
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If the contract itself provides for a
preliminary period definite or indefinite
in which it is to be determined whether
a condition precedent which will make the
contract binding will take place and before
withdrawal of the obligor of the contract,
it becomes bilateral by performance of the
condition precedent, equity may under the
rule above laid down decrease specific
performance in order to do justice or
prevent injustice, as if the contract from
the beginning had been bilateral.
In Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining Co.,
103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d

1094 (1943), the defendants argued that

plaintiff's prayer for specific performance should not be granted
because the plaintiff had refused to per&rm under the provisions
of the agreement and the court did not compel them to do so.

The

court held at 301 Utah 255-256:
We see no merit in the court refusing to
grant specific performance to the petitioner
where he has performed his part simply
because the respondent might not or could
not obtain his specific performance if the
shoe had been on the other foot. It is
very difficult to see why a person who
refuses to perform where the other has
performed may stand up in court and say:
"even though he has done what the contract
required of him and I have not, you should
not make me perform because if he had not
performed and I had performed or tendered
performance, I could not obtain the remedy
of specific performance." The remedy of one
should not depend upon the hypothetical case
of what the other could demand if the situation
were different.
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In the instant case, Respondent tendered his offer to
perform at the Todd School.

In reliance upon his contract of

employment with Appellant, he stood ready to perform.
cites 22 ALR2d

Appellant

508 in support of the proposition that mutuality

of remedy is essential to granting specific performance.
submits that 22 ALR2d

Respondent

508 may be cited on any proposition regarding

the doctrine of mutuality of remedy for the reason that the purpose
of the citation is:
. . . to examine in this annotation
the history and the juridical basis
of the mutuality rule in general,
note the principal authorities
concerning it, suggest the proper
form of it, and review the general
case law and substance of the whole
subject.
Respondent submits that review of the cases cited in
22 ALR2d

508 and the cases cited subsequent thereto clearly

demonstrate a movement by the courts away from the requirement of
mutuality before specific performance will be ordered by the courts.
Appellant cites Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 5A, §1204
(1951 and supplement), to advance three reasons why specific
performance should not be ordered.

-28-
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The first argument is that the decree would be difficult
to enforce.

That would be true only if the court were ordering

Respondent to perform in a workmanlike manner or to the best of
his abilities.

In the instant case, the court is merely ordering

Appellant to reinstate Respondent as a school teacher.

This is

not an action which would require the continuous supervision of
the Court.

In the instant case, Respondent seeks an order of this

Court ordering Appellant to reinstate him as a teacher employed by
Appellant.

If, in the future, Appellant has grounds to terminate

Respondent, it may so do.
Second, Appellant suggests that involuntary servitude
is somehow involved in this matter.

Involuntary servitude would

be involved if the Court were being asked to order Respondent to
render a service.

In this instance, Respondent has asked the Court

to order the Appellant to re-employ him.

If, it is Appellant's

contention that it is being placed in a position of

,f

involuntary

servitude" because of the Court's order requiring it to reinstate
Respondent, the argument is inapplicable as the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States prohibiting "involuntary
servitude" applies only to natural individuals, and not to political
subdivisions.
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Third, Appellant argues that it fosters a "continuing
undesirable relationship between employer and employee."

In this

case, Appellant has never argued that there was an undesirable
relationship.
position.

Appellant has maintained that Respondent quit his

The jury did not believe Appellant.

If an "undesirable

relationship" exists, it is because of the manner
has treated Respondent.

in which Appellant

Appellant should not be able to assert

its own wrongdoing as a basis for refusing to re-employ Respondent.
In School District No. 6 of Pima County v. Barber, 85
Ariz. 95, 332 P.2d 496 (195 8), the court held that a teacher whose
contract of employment would have automatically been renewed unless
a written notice of dismissal was given on or before a certain date,
and that notice was not given, was entitled to reinstatement.
In Matteson v. State Board of Education, 57 C.A.2d 991,
136 P.2d 120 (1943), the court held that where the state commission
on credentials illegaly refused to renew the credentials of a school
teacher, and the local board acted illegaly in dismissing the teacher,
the teacher was entitled to be restored to her position with full
salary from the date of dismissal.
In Mass v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified
School District, 61 C.2d 612, 394 P.2d 579 (1964), the court held
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that a teacher is entitled to reinstatement with full salary and
benefits from the date of suspension where the local board of
education suspended the teacher on charges which the local board
failed to establish.
In Thayer v. Anacortes School District, 81 Wash.2d 709,
504 P.2d 1130 (1972), it concerned the nonrenewal of a teacher/librariai
whose contract with the school district was not renewed allegedly
because of a lack of funds necessitating a reduction in certificated
personnel.

The teacher was the senior librarian.

The court held

that the teacher would be entitled to reinstatement and reasonable
damages if she could show that librarians with less seniority were
retained.

Accord, Lines v. Yakima Public School System, Yakima

School District No. 7, 533 P.2d 104 (Wash. App. 1975).

-31-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The foregoing cases cited by Respondent hold that
reinstatement is a proper remedy where there is a violation of
a statutory right or a contractual right. Were reinstatement not
a proper remedy for the Respondent, the statutory requirements of
the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act could be
effectively avoided by any school district.

For example, a school

district could notify a teacher during February or March of any
year that the teacher was to be terminated.
held on or before June of the same year.
would have to resort to court action.

A hearing could be

Thereafter, the teacher

If the court hearing were

held prior to the commencement of the following school year, the
school teacherTs sole remedy would be for a prospective lost
salary.

Under those circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how

the injured school teacher would satisfy the trier of fact that
his monetary damages would be substantial. Were reinstatement
not afforded school teachers whose statutory rights have been
violated, provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures
Act could be effectively nullified by school district action.

-32-
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POINT III
THE EXISTENCE OF RESPONDENT'S CONTRACT
OF EMPLOYMENT AND ITS TERMS WERE AGREED
BY THE PARTIES.
Appellant claims that the "contract language relating
to preference status in hiring was never received as evidence and
was thus never available for the judge or jury to consider.
(Tr. pp. 58, 114). During the trial, counsel for Respondent
asked Mr. Turner, Clerk-Treasurer of Appellant, to identify what
was offered as Exhibit 11.

Counsel for Appellant objected in the

following language;
MR. LYBBERT:

I will not stipulate to this, Your Honor,

because I have not seen the manner in which this
is formulated and they are comparing it with that.
And perhaps at recess we can get copies of that and
submit it.
MR. DIBBLEE:

All right.

THE COURT:

All right. We f ll reserve a ruling on your

offer until he's
further.

Excellent.

had an opportunity to examine it

(Tr. p. 58).
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Apparently, counsel for Respondent felt no obligation
to examine it further and the record shows that Exhibit 11 was not
offered during the course of trial. However, after the jury was
excused, counsel for Appellant argued that the case should be
dismissed as to Appellant for the reason that Respondent had failed
to show he had a contract.

(Tr. pp. 134, 136).

Appellant's entire defense at trial was that Respondent
had voluntarily resigned and that therefore the district had no
contractual obligation to rehire the Respondent in succeeding years.
At page 74 of the Transcript, counsel for Respondent is asking
Dale Harrison, Principal at the Whiterocks School at the time the
Appellant failed to renew Respondents contract of employment about
the number of years teachers had been employed at Whiterocks.

At

that point, the record shows as follows:
MR. LYBBERT:

If Your Honor please, I think this is immaterial.

I don't think there's any issue in this.
MR. DIBBLEE:

Well, do you admit then that the school did

hire non-tenured personnel in jobs that Mr. Pratt would
have been qualified to do.
MR. LYBBERT:

Absolutely.

-34-
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THE COURT:

I think that is so. The record will show,

Ladies and Gent lenient, that there isnft any question
now, counsel have stipulated and agreed that the School
District did hire untenured people after his employment
ended that Mr. Pratt was capable of performing.
isn't any question about that.

There

(Tr. p. 74).

Moreover, counsel for Appellant in his opening statement
to the jury stated as follows:
I agree with Mr. Dibblee that this is
not a complicated case. As I see it,
the essential issue is whether or not
Mr. Pratt advised Mr. Evans in the spring
of '73 that he didn't wish to have his
contract renewed with the district.
That's the case. (Tr. p. 22).

-35-
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Counsel for Appellant did not object to the court's
summary of counsel1s stipulation.

When a party concedes a fact,
<

declares or stipulates to the existence of a fact material to
the cause of his adversary, no proof is thereafter required.
Butler v. Stratton, 95 C.A.2d 23, 212 P.2d 43 (1949).

A party

who causes the court to understand that certain facts are admitted
cannot object to the hearing being conducted on the basis of that
understanding.

Sundgren v. Sundgren, 363 P.2d 853 (Okla. 1961);

88 CJS, Trials, Section 58, Evidence need not be introduced to prove
a fact admitted by the adverse party or conceded by the adverse
party.

88 CJS, Trials, Section 58.

Where the party not having the burden of proof admits by
counsel in open court, the facts on which the claim of the opposing
party rests, such judicial admission releases the party having the
burden of proof from aducing evidence to prove such facts and bars
the opposing party from disputing them and the party having the
burden of proof is entitled to instructions directing the jury to
take the admitted facts as positively settled.

Hogsett v. Smith,

229 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. App. 1950).

-36-
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Where a party admits in open court the existence of a
fact material to the cause of the adversary, no proof is thereafter
required for a finding on the matter so confessed, and a party who
causes a judge to understand that certain facts are admitted cannot
object to the judge's conducting the trial on the basis of that
understanding.

88 CJS, Trial, Section 58.

Respondent submits that counsel for Appellant did not
keep his representation to the Court that he would examine Respondent's
Exhibit 11 and Mat recess . . . get copies of that and submit it."
AppellantTs brief at page 2 concedes that "Respondent is a tenured
school teacher . . . .rf Appellant1s brief sets forth in some
detail its side of the case arguing that Respondent had resigned.
The jury did not believe Appellant's evidence, and instead chose
to believe the evidence presented by Respondent.

Appellant tried

the case on the theory that it need not honor the provisions of
its contract of employment with Respondent for the reason that
Respondent had resigned his position of employment.

Appellant

should not now be allowed to assert error based upon its failure
to keep its representations to the Court regarding the provisions
of the contract or because it mislead the Court as to whether or
not the provisions of the contract were still an issue.
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POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE
COMPUTED AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Point III of Appellant!s Brief advances the novel
proposition that not only is it the duty of a party claiming
damages to show the amount of damages suffered by him, but it is
also his duty "to show that he has made a reasonable effort to
seek other remunerative employment and mitigate his damages.11
(Tr. p. 149). Appellant correctly cites Kartchner v. H o m e ,
1 Utah 2d 112, 262 P. 2d 749 (1953), for the proposition that it
is the Respondent's burden to produce evidence showing his damages.
In the instant case, Respondent testified that he had sought and
had obtained employment with Turner Lumber Company.

He testified

as to his salary and produced his tax returns for the 1974 tax
year and further produced his check stubs from his employer for
the 1975 tax year.

Thereafter, Mr. Turner, Clerk-Treasurer of

Appellant, was called and testified as to the salary and benefits
Respondent would have received had he continued his employment with
Appellant.

Counsel for Appellant did not cross-examine Respondent

with respect to his efforts to find employment and concludes in his
statement of facts, "In the summer of 1973, the Respondent applied

-38-
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for a teaching position with the Duchesne County School District.
(Tr. pp. 46, 47). Apparently, Respondent was not given an offer
of employment by the Duchesne District . . . ."

(Appellantfs Brief p.4

Having failed to cross-examine Respondent, Appellant now argues
the novel proposition that it "was not required to present rebuttal
or to cross-examine the witnesses in this respect.,f

(Appellant's

Brief p.' 19). Apparently, Appellant urges this Court to adopt the
rule that it is the burden of the Respondent to show he attempted
to mitigate his damages.
Generally speaking, the party who would lose if no
evidence were presented as to an issue regarding damages is charged
with the burden of proving that issue.

22 Am Jur2d, Damages,

Section 291. Where the Appellant asserts matters in reduction
or mitigation of Respondent's claim or asserts matters which defeat
a part of the damages claimed, the burden of proving such
is on the Appellant.

Mikol v. Vlahopoulas, 86 Ariz. 93, 340 P.2d

1000 (1959); Mass v. Board of Education of San Francisco Unified
School District, 61 C.2d 612, 394 P.2d 579 (1964); Powell v. Brady,
30 Colo. App. 406, 496 P.2d 328 (1972); Burr v. Clark, 30 Wash.2d
149, 90 P.2d 769 (1948); Coble v. Osman, 83 Nev. 415, 433 P.2d
259 (1967); State ex rel Freeman v. Sierra County Board of Education,
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49 N # M. 54, 157 P.2d 234 (1945); Pearson v. Sigmund, 503 P.2d 702,
(Ore. 1972).
Appellant implicitly argues that the question of damages
is a matter for the jury to decide.

Respondent concedes that the

amount of damages is ordinarily a question for the jury to decide.
However, where the question of damages is not in dispute and there
is no more than one reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom,
damages become a question of law for the court to decide.
Damages, Section 176(1).

25A CJS,

Having failed to pursue the question of

mitigation of damages, Respondent submits that there were no contested
facts as to the amount of damages which Respondent was entitled,
recover.

Therefore, the court correctly determined that the amount

of Respondents damages should be computed by the court.
Where facts are not in dispute and no more than one reasonable
inference may be drawn therefrom, a question of law for the Court
is presented.

Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 89 Utah 273,

57 P.2d 362 (1933); Wilcox v. Clouad, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1 (1936);
See Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142 (1967).

-40Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
A.

The restrictive provisions of the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act do not apply to actions brought against the state or
political subdivisions arising out of contract nor do those
provisions apply in the case of termination of tenured teachers*
B.

The Respondent is entitled to monetary damages and

an order reinstating him as a school teacher,
C.

The language of Respondent's contract of employment

with Appellant was not an issue as counsel for Appellant conceded
the point in his representations to the jury and to the Court.
D.

The lower court correctly decided that the question

of damages was a question for the court to determine as there was
no dispute regarding the amount of damages suffered by Respondent.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL T. McCOY and
A. M. FERRO
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 322-2408
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to counsel for Appellant,
Merlin R. Lybbert, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, this

day of June, 1976.
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